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Strict Liability Claims Against Hospitals Under
402A
Assume that you are a Pennsylvania resident, entering a Penn-
sylvania hospital for surgery. During the course of the operation,
the bone plug cutter which the surgeon is using slips, cutting fur-
ther than the depth to which it was set. Tests indicate that the
mechanism itself failed, not the skill of the surgeon. As a result of
the slip, you are rendered a quadriplegic.1 What types of causes of
action will the Pennsylvania courts recognize?
The claims that most readily come to mind are: negligence
(against the doctor and hospital), and products liability (against
the manufacturer). There exists a possible third basis of liability.
Plaintiffs in several jurisdictions have brought strict liability ac-
tions under 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts against the
hospital.2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never addressed
this issue, even though the Pennsylvania Superior Court has de-
cided this question on two occasions.3 This comment will review
various state court decisions and their rationales, then advocate a
position for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should it be faced
with'the issue of strict liability in this context.4
1. These constitute the facts of Grubb v Albert Einstein Medical Center, 255 Pa
Super 381, 387 A2d 480 (1978). The plaintiff in Grubb sought to recover under both strict
liability and negligence theories. The court upheld the verdict for the plaintiff. However
four judges would not have held the defendant strictly liable under 402A.
2. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reads:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged
in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the
user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer
has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller.
3. Podrat v Codman-Shurtleff, Inc., 384 Pa Super 404, 558 A2d 895 (1989), allocatur
denied in - Pa - , 569 A2d 1368, and Grubb (cited in note 1).
4. This comment will not address claims involving allegedly defective blood transfu-
sions, since many state commercial codes exclude blood and blood products from strict lia-
bility claims. See McDaniel v Baptist Memorial Hospital, 469 F2d 230 (6th Cir 1972).
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TREATMENTS OF THE CLAIM
The most recent Pennsylvania Superior Court case succinctly il-
lustrates the majority position on the question of whether a hospi-
tal may be held strictly liable under 402A. In Podrat v Codman-
Shurtleff, Inc.,5 the plaintiff suffered injury when the tip of a pair
of forceps broke off during back surgery, and became lodged within
the disc space.6 The tip was subsequently removed from the pa-
tient.7 The plaintiff sued the hospital under the strict liability the-
ory of 402A.8 The trial court granted a nonsuit, and the plaintiff
appealed
The superior court, in affirming the trial court, relied primarily
on the decisions of other jurisdictions, and agreed with these cases
that the language of 402A was virtually dispositive of-this issue.1"
Section 402A applies to a seller of any product in a defective con-
dition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, if the
seller is "engaged in the business of selling such a product."'" The
court, reasoning that the hospital was providing a service rather
than a product to the patient, stated:
Incidental to this service, the treatment of the patient, was the use of an
instrument. The surgical forceps were merely employed by the hospital in
performing its actual function of providing medical services. The hospital's
relationship with the patient did not relate essentially to the use of this
piece of equipment, but to the professional service it provided. 2
This bifurcation of service/product sellers is the recurring theme
of these strict liability cases. A case frequently cited for this bifur-
5. See note 3.




10. Id at 896-98. The court looked to Silverhart v Mount Zion Hospital, 20 Cal App
3d 1022, 98 Cal Rptr 187 (1971) (strict liability does not apply to provision of medical ser-
vices because the hospital does not play an integral role in the overall production or market-
ing of the product); Hector v Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 180 Cal App 3d 493, 225 Cal
Rptr 595 (1986) (strict liability will not lie against the hospital since the patient enters the
hospital to obtain medical treatment, not to purchase a product); Thomas v St. Joseph
Hospital, 618 SW2d 791 (Tex Civ App 1981) (strict liability does not lie where there is no
complaint that the product, per se, was defective apart from the professional services con'
nected with its use); and, Nevauex v Park Place Hospital, 656 SW2d 923 (Tex Civ App
1983) (strict liability will not attach to a hospital when a patient is injured by radiation
therapy even if it is a product because it is intimately and inseparably connected with the
professional services provided).
11. Id at 895. (Emphasis added.)
12. Id at 897. (Emphasis added.)
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cation rationale is Silverhart v Mount Zion Hospital,"3 a California
case. There, the plaintiff sued when a surgical needle broke and
became permanently lodged inside her body.14 The trial court re-
fused to instruct the jury on the issue of strict liability; the plain-
tiff appealed.' 5 The appellate court looked to strict liability cases
involving defendants other than hospitals."6 The court noted that:
[a] significant common element running through the cases is that each of
the defendants against whom the standard of strict liability has been ap-
plied played an integral and vital part in the overall production or market-
ing enterprise. At the very least the defendant in each case was a link in the
chain of getting goods from the manufacturer to the ultimate user or con-
sumer.
The essence of the relationship between a hospital and its patients does not
relate essentially to any product or piece of equipment it uses but to the
professional services it provides. 7
The court, relying on the foregoing reasoning, concluded that the
hospital, not the patient, was the end-user of the needle, so that
the hospital did not fit within the strictures of a 402A defendant.'"
A similar rationale was employed in another California case,
Hector v Cedars-Sinai Medical Center.1 9 In that case, the plaintiff
brought a strict liability claim when the pacemaker installed at the
Medical Center proved to be defective.2" At the trial level, the hos-
pital moved for partial summary judgment on the strict liability
claim.21 The plaintiff appealed the granting of this motion.22 To
support the argument that the hospital was a seller of a product,
the plaintiff pointed to the "routine" 85% surcharge the hospital
added to the pacemakers it ordered from the manufacturer.23 The
court rejected this reasoning.2 4 The court instead accepted the ar-
gument of the hospital that, since it did not stock, recommend,
distribute or sell pacemakers, and that it simply facilitated the im-
13. 20 Cal App 3d 1022, 98 Cal Rptr 187 (1971).
14. Silverhart, 98 Cal Rptr at 188.
15. Id at 189.
16. Id at 189-90.
17. Silverhart, 98 Cal Rptr at 190-91.
18. Id.
19. 180 Cal App 3d 493, 225 Cal Rptr 595 (1986). See also, Vergott v Deseret Pharma-
ceutical Co., 463 F2d 12 (5th Cir 1972) (hospital not a seller engaged in the business of
selling a product).
20. Hector, 225 Cal Rptr at 595.
21. Id.
22. Id at 596.




plantation by completing purchase requisitions, the hospital was
not a seller of a product.25 The court summarized:
The hospital does not order pacemakers for itself, but may fill out the
purchase requisitions for surgeons who order the devices. The hospital does
not stock or recommend pacemakers or provide them to the general public,
dealing with pacemakers only in the context of the courses of treatment for
particular patients. Even then, it is the surgeon who chooses or recommends
the particular device to be implanted; the hospital merely provides adminis-
trative services in connection with the order and support services in connec-
tion with the implantation.
[TIhe patient does not enter the hospital merely to purchase a pacemaker
but to obtain a course of treatment which includes implantation of a
pacemaker.26
Some courts do not accept the service/product rationale of the
Hector court so readily. A good example is the Texas case of
Thomas v St. Joseph Hospital.27 The plaintiff there brought an
action for wrongful death of her husband, a hospital patient whose
hospital gown caught fire.28 The trial court refused to submit strict
liability instructions to the jury.29 The court of appeals was faced
with the issue of whether the hospital could be held strictly liable
under 402A.30 The court noted that the hospital furnished the
gown to the plaintiff's decedent, Mr. Thomas, and that the gown's
cost was considered in the recoupment of the hospital's overhead
costs.3 1 The court then considered the line of cases (including Sil-
verhart32 and Vergott33 ) which refused to impose strict liability for
injuries caused by defective products that were intimately and in-
separably connected with the professional services rendered.3' The
plaintiff in Thomas argued, however, that the Silverhart line of
cases was distinguishable because the supplying of a defective
gown was neither a professional service, nor was it necessarily in-
volved or related to the rendering of professional services.3 5 The
court stated:
Where, as here, a hospital apparently supplies a product unrelated to the
25. Id.
26. Hector, 225 Cal Rptr at 599.
27. 618 SW2d 791 (Tex Civ App 1981).
28. Thomas, 618 SW2d at 793.
29. Id.
30. Id at 796.
31. Id.
32. Silverhart (cited in note 13).
33. Vergott (cited in note 19).




essential professional relationship, we hold that it cannot be said that as a
matter of law the hospital did not introduce the harmful product into the
stream of commerce.
36
The court found that the lower court erred in failing to submit the
strict liability issue to the jury, and remanded to the trial court.
3 7
Reasoning somewhat analogous to the Thomas rationale was ap-
plied in Wisconsin in Johnson v Sears, Roebuck & Co. 38 Johnson
was injured in an automobile accident and sued Sears for improper
installation of the tires.3 9 Sears impleaded a third-party defendant,
Columbia Hospital.' 0 One claim against the hospital was strict lia-
bility." The hospital moved to dismiss this claim.'2 In considering
the strict liability issue, the court first analyzed cases in which a
patient contracted serum hepatitis from a blood transfusion.' 3
Those decisions categorized the transaction as a service rather
than a sale, precluding, claims of breach of implied warranties of
sale." The Johnson court stated:
My decision should not be based on a technical or artificial distinction be-
tween sales-and services. Rather, I must determine if the policies which sup-
port the imposition of strict tort liability would be furthered by its imposi-
tion in this case. In the present context, the question is whether it is in the
public interest for the consumer/patient or the supplier/hospital to bear the
loss incurred by defective, though non-negligent, services. 5
The court divided services provided by the hospital into profes-
sional medical services and mechanical/administrative services.'"
The court held that strict liability would not be imposed upon the
former type of services, but may be imposed upon the latter. The
court reasoned that since medical science is not exact, all a doctor
can be expected to provide is adequate treatment commensurate
with the state of medical science.' 8 "To hold medical professionals
strictly liable under these circumstances would not promote any
36. Id at 796-97.
37. Id at 797.
38. 355 F Supp 1065 (E D Wis 1973).
39. Johnson, 355 F Supp at 1065.
40. Id. The opinion does not state facts upon which Sears sought to implead the hospi-
tal, or facts underlying the strict liability claim.
41. Id.
42. Id.




47. Id at 1066-67.




As to mechanical/administrative services, however, the court set
forth several reasons why these types of services should not be ex-
empt from strict liability.50 First, serious consequences can result
when patients receive defective hospital services. 5 1 Second, laymen
are virtually unable to recognize or control such defective ser-
vices.52 Finally, it is essential that doctors, already impeded by in-
exact science, receive accurate information in order to effectively
treat patients.5 3 "In short, it is in the public interest that those
services which hospitals perform for both doctors and patients be
performed properly. '15 The court acknowledged that this line is
not always a bright one, and urged that decisions be made on an
ad hoc basis.5 5 The court expressly stated that the decision simply
denied the motion to dismiss, and was not a decision on the
merits.
56
Clearly, there is a strong policy argument against approving
strict liability claims against hospitals. It seems obvious that the
addition of another area of liability to the health care industry
would serve to increase the cost of health care.57 Whether the ser-
vice/product rationale seems technical to the point of being spe-
cious or not, the question becomes: Are most injured parties willing
to pay higher insurance premiums and higher hospital costs in or-
der to gain another cause of action against the medical field? A
recent district court case, applying Pennsylvania law, concluded
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would add this third claim
to a plaintiff's arsenal, under specific circumstances.
That case is Karibjanian v Thomas Jefferson University Hospi-
tal,58 where the plaintiff alleged that an injection of thorotrast (a
contrast medium) was inherently unsafe and caused her husband's
death.59 The hospital moved to dismiss the strict liability claim,









57. See Hector v Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 180 Cal App 3d at 507-08, 225 Cal
Rptr at 601.
58. 717 F Supp 1081 (E D Pa 1989).
59. Karibjanian, 717 F Supp at 1082-83.
60. Podrat (cited in note 3).
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ment, quoted comment (f) of 402A,"' which explains the "business
of selling," and stated:
'[i]t is not necessary that the seller be engaged solely in the business of
selling such products. Thus the rule applies to the owner of a motion pic-
ture theatre who sells popcorn or ice cream, either for consumption on the
premises or in packages to be taken home.
The rule does not, however, apply to the occasional seller of food or other
such products who is not engaged in that activity as a part of his business.
Thus it does not apply to the housewife who, on one occasion, sells to her
neighbor a jar of jam. .. .'
So long as a hospital regularly supplies contrast media to its patients, albeit
as an incidental part of its service operations, it seems to fall within 402A as
explained by comment (f).
The comment draws no distinction between suppliers of goods who also
supply services, and those suppliers who simply supply goods.
8 3
The court noted that the contrast medium allegedly came from
the hospital's own inventory, implying that the hospital regularly
supplied the medium to its patients." Additionally, the court rec-
ognized that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had cited comment
61. Grubb (cited in note 1).
62. The full text of Comment (f) of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts reads as follows:
Business of selling. The rule stated in this Section applies to any person engaged in
the business of selling products for use or consumption. It therefore applies to any
manufacturer of such a product, to any wholesale or retail dealer or distributor, and
to the operator of a restaurant. It is not necessary that the seller be engaged solely in
the business of selling such products. Thus the rule applies to the owner of a motion
picture theatre who sells popcorn or ice cream, either for consumption on the prem-
ises or in packages to be taken home.
The rule does not, however, apply to the occasional seller of food or other such prod-
ucts who is not engaged in that activity as a part of his business. Thus it does not
apply to the housewife who, on one occasion, sells to her neighbor a jar of jam or a
pound of sugar. Nor does it apply to the owner of an automobile who, on one occa-
sion, sells it to his neighbor, or even sells it to a dealer in used cars, and this even
though he is fully aware that the dealer plans to resell it. The basis for the rule is the
ancient one of the special responsibility for the safety of the public undertaken by
one who enters into the business of supplying human beings with products which may
endanger the safety of their persons and property, and the forced reliance upon that
undertaking on the part of those who purchase such goods. This basis is lacking in
the case of the ordinary individual who makes the isolated sale, and he is not liable to
a third person, or even to his buyer, in the absence of his negligence. An analogy may
be found in the provision of the Uniform Sales Act, section 15, which limits the im-
plied warranty of merchantable quality to sellers who deal in such goods; and in the
similar limitation of the Uniform Commercial Code, section 2-314, to a seller who is a
merchant. This Section is also not intended to apply to sales of the stock of
merchants out of the usual course of business, such as execution sales, bankruptcy
sales, bulk sales, and the like.
63. Karibjanian, 717 F Supp at 1085. (Citation omitted.) (Emphasis in original.)
64. Id at 1086.
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(f) with approval in Musser v Vilsmeier Auction, Co.6 5 The
Karibjanian court concluded that there was
• . . significant data which suggest Pennsylvania's Supreme Court would
in some circumstances hold a hospital liable under 402A as a seller of a
product like [the medium], if it is the product itself rather than the proce-
dure by which it was administered which is alleged to have been defective."
After predicting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would '
impose strict liability in certain circumstances, Karibjanian ac-
knowledged that some courts might absolutely refuse to hold hos-
pitals strictly liable under 402A.17 One case cited was the Pennsyl-
vania district court opinion in Flynn v Langfitt.8 Flynn was,
decided a mere three months prior to Karibjanian, and arrived at
the opposite conclusion. Flynn was the recipient of a tissue graft
which allegedly caused Flynn to contract staphylococcus meningi-
tis.6 The hospital moved for partial summary judgment on two
theories. Under the first theory, the hospital contended that the
plaintiff was statutorily precluded from making a strict liability.
claim under 42 Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, section 8333.70
The court noted that this statute, a re-enactment of The Medical
Transfusions and Transplants Act, 71 no longer specifically ex-
65. Id at 1085. Musser v Vilsmeier Auction Co., 522 Pa 367, 562 A2d 279 (1989).
There, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an auctioneer is not a "seller" for section
402A purposes unless he has a "direct continuous course of dealing with a manufacturer or
sales organization for their specific products." Musser, 562 A2d at 283.
66. Karibjanian, 717 F Supp at 1085.
67. Id at 1086 (citing•Carmichael v Reitz, 17 Cal App 3d 958, 95 Cal Rptr 381 (1971)
(prescription drug caused injury, but strict liability not applicable to a provider'of profes-
sional services)).
68. 710 F Supp 150 (E D Pa 1989).
69. Flynn, 710 F Supp at 150.
70. 42 Pa Cons Stat section 8333 (1976) states:
(a) General Rule. - No person shall be held liable for death, disease or injury resulting
from the lawful transfusion of blood, blood components or plasma derivatives, or
from the lawful transplantation or insertion of tissue, bone or organs, except upon a
showing of negligence on the part of such person. Specifically excluded hereunder is
any liability by reason of any rule of strict liability or implied warranty or any war-
ranty not expressly undertaken by the party to be charged.
71. 35 Pa Stat section 10021 (Purdon 1972) which stated:
Notwithstanding any other law, no hospital, blood bank or other entity or person
shall be held liable for death or injury, resulting from the lawful transplantation or
insertion of tissue, bone or organs, except upon a showing of negligence on the part of
such hospital, blood bank, entity or person. For purposes of this act negligence shall
include but not be limited to any failure to observe accepted standards in the collec-
tion, testing, processing, handling, storage, transportation, classification, labelling,
preparation or use of any such blood, blood components, plasma derivatives, tissue,
bone or organs. Specifically excluded hereunder is any liability by reason of implied
warranty or any other warranty not expressly undertaken by the party to be charged.
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cluded hospitals as liable parties. 72 Therefore, the court reasoned,
the legislature no longer intended to exempt hospitals from strict
liability under this statute.7
3
This threshold victory for the plaintiff turned out to be hollow,
however, as the court agreed with the hospital's second argument
(that, under Pennsylvania common law, hospitals cannot be held
strictly liable under 402A). The court held that hospitals could not
be strictly liable under section 402A.7 " The court looked to
Grubb, wherein the court stated that, under Pennsylvania case
law, 402A is given wide berth and applies to all sellers in the dis-
tributive chain.78 The Grubb court reasoned that to impose strict
liability on a hospital was to make a reasonable extrapolation from
the expanding interpretation of 402A.77 The Flynn court noted
that although four of the six judges in Grubb concurred in the re-
sult, they further opined that strict liability should not lie against
the hospital.78 The Flynn court recognized that Grubb's superficial
approval of strict liability had not been formally adopted by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.7 9 The Flynn court thus refused to
recognize the strict liability claim, and granted partial summary
judgment for the hospital.80
CONCLUSION
Distinguishing Karibjanian from the cases rejecting 402A liabil-
ity is difficult. In Podrat81 and Hector,2 for example, the plaintiffs'
claims of liability went to the product itself (forceps and a pace-
maker, respectively), and not to the procedure involved in utilizing
the products. Seemingly, the Karibjanian court implicitly rejected
the service/product distinction, and thus predicted that the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court would do the same. This is somewhat
troubling, especially in the face of the strong expression of the
This act was repealed in 1978 by Pub L No 202-53 section 2(a)[1450], effective June 27,
1978.
72. Flynn, 710 F Supp at 151.
73. Flynn, 710 F Supp at 151.
74. Id at 152.
75. Grubb v Albert Einstein Medical Center, 255 Pa Super 381, 387 A2d 480 (1978).
76. Flynn, 710 F Supp at 152.
77. Id.
78. Id at 151-52.
79. Id at 152.
80. Id.
81. Podrat v Codman-Shurtleff, Inc., 384 Pa Super 404, 558 A2d 895 (1989), allocatur
denied in __Pa-, 569 A2d 1368.
82. Hector (cited in note 19).
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Podrat court that 402A claims will not be permitted against a hos-
pital defendant. Obviously, until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
grants allocatur on such a case, we cannot know what the outcome
or rationale will be.
The question of the applicability of 402A to hospitals can be
viewed as one of a decision of justice versus policy. Should the jus-
tice obtained by an injured party when he recovers from all tor-
tious parties prevail over the policies of recognizing the inexacti-
tude of medical science and keeping health care costs as low as
possible? Policy should prevail here. Plaintiffs can and do suffer
staggering injuries at the hands of medical professionals. These
claims should be confined to the traditional ones of malpractice.
When a surgical instrument or implant is defective to the point of
causing injury, the plaintiffs should confine their strict liability
claims to the manufacturer. A hospital has no control over the
manufacturing process, and should thus not be held to that stan-
dard. A hospital may be guilty of negligence for failure to properly
inspect or use surgical instruments - negligence is therefore the
proper claim against the hospital.s3 In the face of ever-increasing
health and insurance costs, the application of 402A is one area of
tort law that should not be expanded.
Medical science truly is inexact. Neither physicians nor the hos-
pitals in which they work are infallible. The policies underlying
'modern strict liability are not oriented toward the provision of
medical services. The general basis of imposition of strict liability
under 402A is that the defendant ought to have an obligation to
pay for the costs attributable to injuries caused by defects of a
kind that made the product more dangerous than it would other-
wise be.84 Three major theories have influenced courts in imposing
strict liability on manufacturers. These theories may be stated as:
1) the costs of injuries due to defectively dangerous products is
best borne by the manufacturers, who can shift these costs to the
product's consumers by way of higher prices; 2) accident preven-
tion can be encouraged by adopting a strict liability standard; and,
3) since fault or negligence is difficult to prove in a defective prod-
uct context, proof of fault or negligence should not be required.85
83. See Tonsic v Wagner, 458 Pa 246, 329 A2d 497 (1974) (hospital may be liable for
negligence when surgical instrument is left in the patient's body).
84. Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Torts at 692 (West, 5th ed 1984).
85. Prosser, Torts at 692 (cited in note 84). Consider that
(1) The costs of damaging events due to defectively dangerous products can best be
borne by the enterprisers who make and sell these products. The assumption is that
Vol. 29:109i
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The result of this judicial posture was the adoption of Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts by the American Law
Institute. 6 It does not make sense to transfer the foregoing theo-
ries to the medical world. Strict liability does not promote social
benefit in the same way (or in any way) when applied to hospitals
and doctors. Unlike manufacturers, hospitals are not enterprisers
who make or sell products, so that the first theory supporting strict
liability does not apply. Hospitals are not normally in a position to
prevent such incidents since they do not design or manufacture
products that cause harm. Therefore, the second theory underlying
strict liability is not appropriately applied to hospitals.. Lastly, the
difficulty in proving fault or negligence should be irrelevant in in-
quiries of a hospital's liability. Due to the inherent uncertainties of
medicine, hospitals do not stand on the same footing as manufac-
turers, and are usually unable to control product defects. Thus,
there are no institutional reasons to obviate proof of fault. The
traditional malpractice standard is appropriate for professional
medical services gone awry.
Although the professional versus mechanical and administrative
distinction can be hazy, imposition of strict liability only on the
latter type of service makes better sense. Mechanical or adminis-
trative services, such as supplying a hospital gown or a hospital
bed, seem to be sufficiently within the scope of a hospital's control
so that strict liability is a more appropriate cause of action. Liabil-
ity for defects in these types of products is far removed from the
inexactness of medicine. Quality control over these "support"
items is more easily monitored by hospital administration than is
the purchase of a tiny machine that is implanted into the human
body in order to keep it alive. A defective hospital bed (a mechani-
cal/administrative service) supplied by the hospital purchasing
agent, is more akin to a defective bed supplied directly, by the
manufacturer to a consumer, than is the pacemaker (a medical
product) supplied by the hospital to the patient.
There exists Pennsylvania case law rejecting the service/product
the manufacturer can shift the costs of accidents to purchasers for use by charging
higher prices for the costs of products. (2) The cause of accident prevention can be
promoted by the adoption of strict liability and the elimination of the necessity for
proving negligence. (3) Fault or negligence is often difficult to prove in this context,
and for institutional reasons and because of the costs of litigation, proof of the exis-
tence of fault or negligence in the sale of a defective product should no longer be
required, especially if product defect is properly defined and limited.




distinction as a ground upon which to deny a strict liability claim.
In Hoffman v Misericordia Hospital of Philadelphia,s7 a case de-
cided well before Podrat, the court faced a breach of warranty
claim when the plaintiff contracted and died from serum hepatitis
as the result of a blood transfusion."' The court held that it did not
. . . feel obligated to hinge any resolution of the very important issue here
raised on the technical existence of a sale. . . . 'It seems to us a distortion to
take what is, at least arguably, a sale, twist it into the shape of a service,
and then employ this transformed material in erecting the framework of a
major policy decision.'89
The service/product distinction seems to be one without a differ-
ence. Strict liability should not be imposed on hospitals for medi-.
cal/professional services, but not because this type of service is not
a sale of a product. An open and honest admission by the court
that neither public policy nor the origins of modern strict liability
support this imposition of liability upon medical services is war-
ranted. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court should also recognize
that technical services and/or products provided by a hospital can
and should be distinguished from medical services. Moreover, tech-
nical services and/or products are more readily within the adminis-
trative control of a hospital, so that traditional strict liability poli-
cies and applications should be imposed upon the party
responsible for placing the defective service or product into the pa-
tient's hands.
Under the facts of Grubb, ° given at the beginning of this com-
ment, the bone plug cutter clearly constitutes a medical product,
not a mechanical/administrative service. Therefore, under the fore-
going analyses, no 402A liability should lie against the hospital.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court should follow the lead of the
Johnson court, which divided hospital services into medical and
mechanical/administrative, and decide these 'strict liability cases
on an ad hoc basis. Granted, this approach does not lend itself to
predictability in the courtroom. This approach does, however, pro-
tect plaintiffs and recompense their injuries by encouraging hospi-
tals to carefully and responsibly scrutinize their purchasing prac-
tices with an eye towards the patient, not the bottom line.
Melissa Moore
87. 439 Pa 501, 267 A2d 867 (1970).
88. Hoffman, 267 A2d at 868.
89. Id at 870. (Citation omitted.)
90. Grubb (cited in note 1).
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